ABSTRACT: Under today's European constitutional demands, effective judicial protection sets the
Context and teleology: an effective judicial protection as European Union general principle and fundamental right
Effective judicial protection comes, in light of the European Union (EU) law, as a general principle that received concrete consecration in Article 19(1) and (2) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). For that matter, it stands for the ability that all must go to court in order to exercise a right or to demand a conduct/abstention from another. When it relates to EU law themes, it states that someone can appear before the European courts (both organic and national courts when the latter applies EU law) to "uphold a right conferred to a litigant by Union law".
1
It directly relates to a jurisdictional approach that all legal orders must allow and it permits to approach one of the major characteristics that make the EU a Union based on the rule of law.
As recognised by Alessandra Silveira, "[t] he EU creates law and is bound by the law that it itself creates" since it has "1) its own institutions; 2) procedures that aim to set and interpret European rules; 3) mechanisms which sanction its eventual violation" 2 -this allows us to describe EU as an Union based on the rule of law because "the Union's public power's exercise must be submitted to the law".
3
In this matter, the EU also relies on "its own procedural system" with "jurisdictional mechanisms and courts that secure the judicial protection". 4 However, looking at the 2 nd paragraph of the Article 19(1) of the TEU, we find the following legal provision: "Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law". From this statement, we can derive that effective judicial protection relates, in a closer sense, to another EU general principle: the principle of National Procedural Autonomy.
5
The principle of National Procedural Autonomy made clear that is it up to Member States to create all necessary judicial means and legal procedures that can be used to enforce/recognise rights derived from EU law. In fact, since the Rewe judgement, the CJEU described the principle: "in the absence of [Union] rules on the subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have from […] [Union] law". 6 So, in effect, the Rewe principle states that it is the Member States, themselves, that determine effective judicial protection, using their own procedural rules. However, procedural autonomy demands limits, which will be set under the "testprinciples" of equivalence and effectiveness (in a strict sense).
The principle of equivalence will allow us to test if national procedural solutions
are not "less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions".
The principle of effectiveness will allow us to test if those national procedural solutions render "practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by [Union] law". 8 If so, national rules must be set aside in order to national judge be able to recognise and enforce rights derived from EU law.
As we can understand -not only in a literal sense, but also in a teleological one -both effective judicial protection and procedural autonomy have a close relation, working together towards the same goal: to create the necessary environment so national judicial structures feel engaged on developing and pursuing European solutions, using national procedural means in a perspective of close application of EU law.
In this sense, the principle of effective judicial protection can be applicable "to both the Union judicature and to the national courts of the Member States" 9 -it is, in fact, from this synergy that we are able to unravel our context in order to understand the idea of a Union's inter-jurisdictionality, which allocates implicit means of constitutionality control.
Furthermore, effective judicial protection also received literal consecration as a fundamental right, in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU). For that matter, we can find, in its three paragraphs, several dimensions inserted in the scope of effective judicial protection: the right to action (in the 1 st paragraph), defence rights (in the 2 nd paragraph), the right to be represented in litigation (in the 2 nd part of the 2 nd paragraph) and the right to legal aid (3 rd paragraph). Nowadays, fundamental rights' protection and observance assume a "central place" "which was reasserted through the entry into force of the Lisbon's Treaty, which brought, with article 6 of the TEU, the recognition of legal biding force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union".
10
It started to appear as "the proper catalogue of fundamental rights […] biding to all organs and to the EU Institutions, as for the MS, when they apply Union law".
11
In fact, this is the way forward since, as we already stated before, " [o] nly something like this would be possible to mature a system of fundamental rights' protection and it would allow judicial operators to be able to grasp, in a effective way, its functioning in the European juridical system, being able to overcome difficulties derived from this new regime that does not relate to appeals to an international instance […] but that installs itself, primarily, in litigation posed before national instances".
12
Having said this, effective judicial protection is the setting where our own scope rests since it clarifies the intrinsic and external manifestations where the involvement capacity has been widened to promote a better functioning of the mechanisms we are going to approach today.
Since effective judicial protection is the beginning and the ending of our dogmatic digression, we must set the tone of our first premise: it is important to adopt a better, modernised and improved sense of EU Procedure. In fact, this is the operational concept that must be engaged when we talk about procedural solutions to demand rights, i.e., when we talk about effective judicial protection.
And it is important to adopt European terminology and adapt it to new realities: since EU Procedure can embrace all procedural realities, as we will be able to see.
Widening the concept of EU Procedure: reflections
Dogmatically, this concept can be understood in two major senses:
-Concerning its functional or organic approach; -Concerning its material approach. The first one originally related and described the setting of the organic European courts It described how the CJEU worked, how it was composed (nowadays, by the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Specialized Courts), its structure, functioning and organisation. Nonetheless, there were authors 13/14 that could innovate and this widened the functional notion of EU Procedure. In fact, those authors remembered that EU law is mainly applied by national courts which, by doing so, are acting as European functioning courts 15 or as courts of "common law of the European Union".
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In this concept's enlarged understanding, EU Procedure aims to understand and to study the procedural impulses that are given both by European organic courts and national courts, when applying EU law. This, in fact, opened the opportunity to study the articulations between national and European courts through the preliminary ruling, when doubts concerning the validity of EU acts and/or a difficulty with the interpretation of EU law arises, allowing national courts to establish a profound dialogue with the CJEU.
In this scenario, we have paid special attention to the dichotomy "Formal Dialogue/Informal Dialogue" that can be maintained between national courts and the CJEU, which we will be able to address later.
We also should understand the material approach of EU Procedure. In fact, most authors have not devoted enough attention to this dimension that is still presented in a strict sense, as the setting of procedural rules that establish how procedures/ litigation will be developed before European organic courts. Bearing this definition in mind, only the rules of procedure dealt with in the Treaties, in the Rules of Procedure and the Statute of the European organic courts would be operant to that notion. However, this approach would only lead us to an outdated setting, especially if bearing in mind, the enlarged concept adopted under the organic concept of EU Procedure we already stressed.
In this concept, we believe two major innovations should be made: -It also has to endorse procedural rules contemplated on European secondary law, namely Regulations that must be met and applied by national courts; -It has also to endorse national procedural rules when national courts face EU litigation, even though the national rule is, in fact, European law at its fount (because it derives from transposition or EU law concretisation measures) or not (it is only national law applicable by the observance of the principle of the procedural autonomy). Therefore, if today it is consensual that, organically, also national courts can be subsumed to the notion of EU Procedure, we also have to modernise the material approach in order to cover all procedural rules that can be activated when EU law is applicable to the case -it will include procedural rules derived from primary EU law, but also secondary EU law (namely Regulations) and national rules when they are applicable to the litigation in the scope of application of EU law, despite the fact that those derive from a transposition or a EU law national concretisation or they are national rules called to the equation by the principle of procedural autonomy.
Taking into consideration the need to define EU Procedure, we are going to bear in mind two major European procedural mechanisms to understand if there is a method/a means of constitutional review in the EU context: the infringement procedure and the preliminary ruling process and, for that matter, if we should understand the need of the fundamental rights procedural mechanism existence.
Procedural instruments under EU law as potential constitutional control mechanisms
Dogmatically, there are two mechanisms that can act in that sense: the infringement procedure and the preliminary ruling. The first one is more intuitive since it can be related to an abstract constitutional review made by a specialised court -the Court of Justice. The second one, the preliminary ruling, in its validity approach, can operate as a suis generis incidental, concrete and diffuse constitutional control secured by the same specialised court (also the Court of Justice).
The infringement procedure
The infringement procedure is set under Articles 258 to 260 TFEU. It does not contemplate the possibility of private parties to resort to the CJEU since they lack active legitimacy.
As we already stressed, the EU appears as a Union based on the rule of law "since its Treaties act as its material Constitution" 
22
For this reason, we can understand why the infringement procedure can act, in the EU, as a constitutional control mechanism in order to "refrain breaches of EU Treaties" 23 since they are the EU's "basic constitutional charter" 24/25 . Therefore, the CJEU appears, in the infringement procedure, as "EU law's assurer" as this procedural mechanism has, "as last addressee, the national legislator"
26
. In addition to those characteristics, this procedure has a strong impact on Member States juridical orders -in fact, "it means subdue a Member State to a public procedure where it is exposed for its infringement amongst its peers and before public opinion".
27
It has two major legitimate parties that can initiate the proceedings: the European Commission (under Article 258 of the TFEU) and another Member State (under article 259 of the TFEU).
However, it can be seen as the underdog by the doctrine, especially since it does not recognize individuals' legitimacy.
As stated in the beginning, effective judicial protection establishes the context and the setting of this dogmatic approach. Therefore, it is already clear that the infringement procedure acts as an abstract and concentrated constitutional control mechanism. Its functioning has been improving -on what effective judicial protection is related -especially, with the increasing importance given to private parties' complaints presented to the Commission.
In fact, a private party (an individual or a legal person) can present a complaint to the European Commission about actions/omissions of a Member State's public entities that can determine a breach of the EU legal order.
There are some formal requirements that a complaint must meet, to be accepted; it has to be written, stating, as accurately as possible, the infringement and determining the losses already felt by the complainant. "It must also state why Commission's intervention is important to resettle EU legality".
28
However, no juridical reasoning is mandatory.
29
It is submitted online, using an electronic form (available in all EU official languages). The Commission will give notice to the complainant of the receipt of the complaint "within 15 working days and it will have a time frame of 12 months to analyse the complaint and to decide whether to initiate an infringement procedure or not". Despite this, the Commission continues to maintain its discretionary power on how to initiate the infringement procedure and whether or not it will present the case to the CJEU.
30
This discretionary power also prevents individuals from demanding, from the Commission, the adoption of any procedural position.
31
Taking into consideration effective judicial protection constraints, the Commission made this complaint instrument a powerful tool so that private parties are able to report Member States' infringements -which steamed from the update made on the Commissions' Communication on how to handle complaints.
32
As determined in this Communication, those complaints are "free of charge" 33 and, despite some exceptions, 34 they will be recorded in a central application. So that the private party can be aware of the complaint's reception, a registration number will be given to it and all further communications with the European Commission must mention that number.
35
The most important feature it that "[a]ll further developments will be noticed, in writing, to the complainant -from the formal notice to the referral to the ECJ or the closure of the case".
36
Complainants' data will be secured since the Commission is bound to fulfil European data protection standards.
37
Despite these precisions concerning securing claimants' rights to understand how their complaints are being dealt, there are still voices raised concerning the need to open up the possibility of private parties being able to have active legitimacy.
38
In this sense, I have already recognised the need to settle an avenue individuals can use in order to directly address the Court. It is our belief that the next step may be that (or a similar) development. Despite the fact there is an increased importance given to the complaint presented by individuals, that can act as a means of improving fundamental rights' protection and, therefore, be able to determine truly that the infringement procedure can act as a constitutional control. 
Preliminary ruling: validity issues
On the other hand, we also find the preliminary ruling process. It is enshrined under Article 267 of the TFEU which is "available to national courts, as European functioning courts, so they can ask the competent jurisdictional organ to that matter (i.e. the CJEU, the interpretation/validity's verification of EU law with relevance to the sub judice circumstance".
39
As ascertained by the CJEU, " [t] he reference for a preliminary ruling is a fundamental mechanism of European Union law aimed at enabling the courts and tribunals of the Member States to ensure uniform interpretation and application of that law within the European Union".
40
However, as some European authors stress, this is a very innovative mechanism, since it does not presuppose any hierarchical relationship between national courts and the CJEU.
41
In the wise words of Christiaan Timmermans, the preliminary ruling can be perceived as a "formal dialogue" 42 between national courts and the CJEU since it delivers a jurisdictional cooperation 43 between courts.
44
As we will see, the most relevant type of preliminary ruling to this discussion is the validity one. For that matter, we need to settle the notion of validity: in this particular theme, the Advocate General Karl Roemer was able, in its Conclusions, 
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In fact, this approach is also a concrete observance of that subjective dimension that, more recently, underlies the preliminary ruling.
As presented by Alessandra Silveira, the preliminary ruling is "an effective judicial protection's service -i.e., doctrine has been highlighting the subjective dimension of the preliminary 
ruling, that one which is important to the defence of individuals' rights".
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When preliminary references have been made to pose questions concerning invalidity of a European disposition (of derived law), we can foresee that the validity is going to be assessed under the standard given by the Treaties and the CFREU, so it can also be devised as a constitutional control. For that matter, when it comes to asking the CJEU about a European act's validity because of its potential damage to fundamental rights, enshrined in the CFREU, it will also serve as a judicial cooperation function in fundamental rights' protection in the EU.
Furthermore, this subjective dimension seems to be deepened by the decision Foto-Frost. 51 Actually, from the literal sense derived from Article 267 of the TFEU (and its predecessors), it seemed that, even when validity issues would be raised in the preliminary reference, it would only be mandatory courts to refer to the CJEU if they were deciding at last instance. Conversely, the decision Foto-Frost changed that understanding; the CJEU stated that the observance of just an unlimited ability to refer, when validity questions were raised, could compromise the uniformity of EU law, as derived from Recitals 14 and 15 of the decision. 52 However, there are voices that do not accept this reasoning, understanding the CJEU went too far since the Article concerning preliminary references did not mean this. They understand "CJ adopted […] a solution that implied a praetorian creation of lawinnovating, one more time, against the rules enshrined in the Treaties".
53
That notwithstanding, a national judge, facing a matter of validity appreciation, has the ability not to submit a preliminary reference to the CJEU "if he considers that he must see as valid the questioned act". 54 However, there will be always an obligation to present a preliminary reference if he is able to devise that the litigation solution can "imply an invalidity declaration". of the TFEU are only those that can undermine an act of EU Institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and they are the same as those evoked under the action of annulment (Article 263 of the TFEU).
Despite methodological criticisms that can be levelled against Foto-Frost decision, the reality is that one allow us, in an even more proper sense, to understand that the preliminary ruling can act as a constitutional control, especially because, in the name of EU law's uniform application, validity questions have always to be referred to the CJEU.
Concretisations under inter-jurisdictionality theory
Inter-jurisdictionality stands for different and complementary jurisdictional systems living together in the same constitutional and legal space and it aims to understand how their reflexive interactions can be maintained to fully promote the principle of effective judicial protection.
57
This unique concept has profound effects on the "organizational scheme of access to justice consecrated in the constitutional texts […] and in the States' internal legislation".
58
In the EU context, inter-jurisdictionality will allow that "the applicability of material law of a normative level is secured within that same level", 59 which means that, when litigation derives from the scope of application of EU law, the courts will have to solve it using the means set in that same legal space -the EU space (even if the procedural solutions derive from national legislation, they are being used based on the general principle of Member States' procedural autonomy, which is developed under EU law).
Furthermore, fundamental rights' protection (or the inter jusfundamentality 60 approach, as perceived by Gomes Canotilho) is a concern that cannot be also forgotten when we are dealing with an inter-jurisdictional setting. Taking those developments into consideration, effective judicial protection and the inter-jurisdictional approach (that emanates from it) are in close connection with those worries concerning fundamental rights' protection in the EU. When we try to perceive constitutional control mechanisms in this same legal space, we are also trying to unravel efficient judicial mechanisms that are able to secure and ensure fundamental rights in this legal order and, for that matter, the highest standard of protection that exists in the EU context, namely the CFREU. Here, we try to exercise, even if timidly, the necessary exegesis to unravel the jurisdictional mechanisms the EU legal system has so that they are able to appear as constitutional review mechanisms (and act as those). Consequently, they will be able to secure fundamental rights' protection without needing a new and proper judicial figure to do so because This understanding allows us to take the step forward. Since national courts are called upon, Member States' procedural autonomy also comes into light, which also determines that national procedural rules have to be contemplated in the wider material notion of EU Procedure.
One of those instruments of unitary control is the preliminary ruling but, it also aims to consider those judicial control means "composed by procedural […] impositions that conduct the discretionary range's reduction of national authorities". 65 In this sense, the infringement procedure fits in this profile because it can be seen as the ultimate judicial mechanism to limit and even control national discretionary powers, especially when it comes to Directives' lack of transposition.
In fact, the preliminary ruling, especially the validity type, can be at the service of fundamental rights' protection and become a sui generis constitutional control in which the CJEU by considering invalid a European legal rule, it is going to be doing that taking as legality referral the constitutive Treaties and the CFREU [article 6(1) of the TEU]. On the other hand, the infringement procedure can be seen as a more intuitive constitutional control instrument of both actions and omissions of Member States, taking as reference, the terms emanating from the Treaties and the CFREU.
But our reflection also has some support on empirical sensibilities, namely based on the recently published CJEU's 2016 Annual Report.
In 2016, 453 preliminary rulings and 34 infringement procedures were brought before that Court. 31 concerning failure to fulfil obligations and three concerning twofold failure to fulfil obligations. 66 the CJEU declared the infringement of 16 Member States in 27 different procedures and decided twofold failure to fulfil obligations in two situations.
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Furthermore, the Court is the competent one to deal with these procedures, where the proceedings' duration is around 14.7 months long.
68
In this particular context, Christiaan Timmermans also called our attention to an "informal dialogue" 69 between the CJEU and national courts. This dialogue aims to increase effective judicial protection:
-Two times a year, the Court promotes an informal meeting with Member
States' judges to inform them on its functioning and to hear about their doubts and worries; -The Court of Justice also receives Member States' superior courts delegations and reunions happen following a round-table system; 70 -The Court also visits national supreme and constitutional courts; -It is usual to the CJEU to engage in interactions with judges and public prosecutors' associations.
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This judicial proximity (which promotes sociological integration) comes from the courts' will to collaborate. This knowledge demands improving judicial relations between the CJEU and national courts so that the latter feel engaged in the prosecution of fundamental rights recognised under the EU legal order.
In the same informal approach, we must bear in mind improvements made on complaints presented by individuals before the European Commission concerning grounds for infringement procedures. As we had the opportunity to mention, complaints are one of the most effective means to improve, in an indirect way, the engagement of individuals and has recently received a more transparent treatment by the Commission.
Practical derivations concerning fundamental rights' protection: effective judicial protection under the microscope -legal aid dimension and Portuguese reality
Effective judicial protection saw its dimensions being stipulated as fundamental rights, in the CFREU, and one of those is the right to have legal aid in circumstances of financial insufficiency.
Concerning legal aid, the EU has adopted Directive 2003/8/CE to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes.
Portugal adopted national legislation, Lei 34/2004, 72 to partially transpose that Directive, which gives Member States the possibility to predict less restrictive conditions since the European act only established minimum rules.
It was thought to promote better access to justice, mainly to those who "lack 
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The Directive is binding and requires Member States to observe its minimum rules -forbidding them from adopting more restrictive ones -but leaves them the necessary freedom to create a more favourable regime in their internal legal order. Taking into consideration this ability, some of them -such as Portugal -recognised the possibility of some legal persons to have the right to legal aid, as we can derive from Article 7(3) of the national legislation (Lei 34/2004) .
Despite this, we already had the chance to comment on some national jurisprudence that wrongfully interpreted EU law applicable to the litigation
81
-not only the Directive's scope of application, but, more incisively, the interpretation of Article 47 of CFREU, forgetting the settled case law of the CJEU, namely the DEB Deutsche decision.
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New developments concerning national jurisprudence were faced, especially in a Portuguese Constitutional Court's decision and it is important to analyse this particular jurisprudence in order to understand, in a practical way, how fundamental rights' protection has been observed under Portuguese national reality so that we able to settle which steps forward must be set in motion and derived dogmatically so that fundamental rights can be truly observed in a integrated judicial space as it is the EU.
Analysing the Portuguese Constitutional Court decision: namely, decision 591/2016
In this particular approach, the wording of Gomes Canotilho is particularly enlightening: "[i]n terms of interjurisdictionality, it is interesting to verify if the articulation of several levels of access to courts can or not be translated in restrictions to opening the judicial via".
83
As we will perceive, there is a matter concerning the understanding of effective judicial protection and it is important to unravel how the Portuguese Constitutional Court approached the matter, especially when it comes to one of the most effective judicial protection dimensions -legal aid.
On November 9 th , 2016, the Portuguese Constitutional Court issued decision nr. 591/2016, concerning an incidental and concrete constitutionality control presented before this court.
In the litigation, a legal person presented, before the competent national administrative authority (Instituto da Segurança Social, I.P. -Centro Distrital de Braga), a request for legal aid, which was refused without further consideration since Article 7 (3) The court decided against the legal person because of the "clear impracticability" of the litigation, holding, inter alia, that the national legislation was not unconstitutional since Article 20 of the Portuguese Constitution demands concretisation matters and, for that matter, the limitation emanating from the national legislation was not compromising the Constitution's setting since other legal mechanisms could be used by the litigator, such as financial stress.
However, the national court did not mention anything concerning EU law and the interpretation national legal rules should meet under EU general principles. The litigator did not rest with that decision and presented a constitutionality appeal to the Portuguese Constitutional Court, which gave light to the decision we are now addressing, considering the national rule as contrary to Article 20 of the Portuguese Constitution when it states that legal persons operating for profit are not able to have legal aid, without minding their particular economic situation or their financial specificities. Furthermore, accepting the complete and absolute exclusion of legal persons operating for profit from the ratio and the teleology of Article 7(3) of the Lei 34/2004, it would take away from a whole category of subjects (that also have the right to access to courts to exercise their rights) a right that is acknowledged both by the national Constitution but also by biding international regimes of fundamental rights/human rights' protection, to which Portugal is bound. In this sense, the Constitutional Court states that an evaluation about the legal person's economic situation should be made in order to prevent there being an absolute and disproportionate lack of legal aid to all legal persons operating for profit.
We must bear in mind the final tale of numbers 7 and 8 of this decision in order to understand major conclusions we are going to extract. In this particular approach, the Constitutional Court summarized the majority position under the Constitutional Court by stating that, under this understanding "
[…] legal aid to legal persons operating for profit comes as dysfunctional and potentially, a generator of inequalities between competing companies in the same market and […] as a potential unbalancing factor for that market".
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Refusing that approach, the Portuguese Constitutional Court recalls the CJEU DEB Deutsche decision.
In this decision, the CJEU started to understand that, although Article 47(3 rd paragraph) of the CFREU seems to refer itself only to individuals, it does not exclude legal persons, even if taking its literal sense into consideration. In fact, "reflecting on the Chapter VI where article 47 is inserted, makes sense, systematically, to include legal persons": 89 in fact, in that Chapter VI we can find "other procedural principles […] which apply to both natural and legal persons".
90
Furthermore, since effective judicial protection was not included in the CFREU's Chapter concerning "Solidarity", it cannot be "[…] conceived primarily as social assistance" to understand it "[…] reserved to natural persons".
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Even more, to set aside any doubts, the CJEU continues, despite the fact that Directive 2003/8/CE does not contemplate legal aid to legal persons, that does not mean that we can derive from that a general conclusion since it derives, from the scope of the Directive's application, that it only establishes minimum rules, allowing Member States to create more favourable regimes.
In this sense, the CJEU concluded that "the grant of legal aid to legal persons is not in principle impossible, but must be assessed in the light of the applicable rules and the situation of the company concerned"
92
-by doing so, the CJEU shows the company's economic situation must be assessed, taking into consideration the criteria this court underlines in Recital 54: "the form of the company […] ; the financial capacity of its shareholders; the objects 
96
In the same sense, it uses the previous syllogism to avoid a discrimination of legal persons domiciled in Portugal and pleading here. Despite not saying so, the Constitutional Court derived that sense from the need to 93 avoid discrimination based on nationality, also a fundament derived from EU law.
As we can foresee, the Portuguese Constitutional Court had an impressive approach on the matter, using EU law to reinforce its position, especially to undermine previous jurisprudence of that same Court in the opposite sense. However, as we could derive, EU law was called upon in the discussion concerning the possibility of distorting competition in the Internal Market and, especially, appearing as state aid, in the sense of Article 107 of the TFEU.
The litigation was quite similar to the one posed before the CJEU in the DEB Deutsche case. However, after using the settled jurisprudence, the Portuguese Constitutional Court derived new approaches and understood, in the underlying context of that decision, something innovative concerning legal aid not being seen as a means to distort competition and, furthermore, not appearing as state aid. Since it is a completely new approach, the Portuguese Constitutional Court should have presented a preliminary ruling to the CJEU in order to fully fulfil the integration purpose the preliminary ruling brings.
By not doing so, the Portuguese Constitutional Court still does not really understand how and when it has to refer to the CJEU -and the case only posed an interpretative preliminary reference... Therefore, in an issue of fundamental rights' protection, a Constitutional Court was not able to refer -this means that there is still some unfamiliarity concerning how contemporary European judicial mechanisms work. Creating new schemes and procedural solutions would only import new problems to an old discussion.
Nonetheless, the CJEU's Annual Report shows Portuguese preliminary references are increasing -and we must enjoy this reality instead of creating and setting a new mean of disturbance. Furthermore, it is quite impressive seeing the Portuguese Constitutional
Court approach EU law in such an innovative way -however, it would be greater if a preliminary ruling was made concerning those potential distortions in the Internal Market and in free competition, so that all Member States could enjoy new developments in understanding effective judicial protection and, especially, legal aid, namely when it comes to legal persons operating for profit.
Final remarks
Effective judicial protection sets the tone, the context and the finalistic approach we are aiming to meet in these final remarks since it is the visible, palpable and operative face of interjurisdictional phenomenon which explains the setting and functioning of judicial mechanisms in the EU.
Therefore, interjurisdictional phenomenon comes as the method to be adopted so we can extract conclusions that do not collide with the promotion of efficient legal and judicial protection. This is quite important -if not vital -in a legal order with its own judicial instruments to both interpret and to scrutinize the rules that the juridical order creates -which leads us to the idea of the EU being a true Union of Law.
Taking this into consideration, this reflection is only possible if we embrace a wider notion of EU Procedure: not only from a functional/organic approach, where national courts are contemplated in its definition; but also in a material approach to mind derived EU law where procedural rules are established and national procedural solutions are used to deal with EU law litigation under the scope of Member States' procedural autonomy.
Bearing in mind EU is acting as a Union of Law, where the Treaties (and the CFREU, as stressed by Article 6 of the TEU) are its constitutional basis, we understand there are two main instruments that can act as constitutional control mechanisms:
-The infringement procedure; -The preliminary ruling, namely the validity type. The first one operates as an abstract and concentrated constitutional review since it aims to declare infringements committed by breaching Member States to fulfil obligations that emanate from the Treaties (as those obligations derived from national Constitutions that demand legislative concretisation). The second one can be perceived as a concrete and diffuse constitutional control, being operated on litigation emerging before "common courts" 97 of EU law -national courts. In fact, especially when it comes to the obligation of referring cases to the CJEU which concern validity issues, we are able to understand that a constitutional analysis is demanded from the Court: national courts are referring this to the Court of Justice so it can state if a European act/disposition is in conformity with the European constitutional framework set by the Treaties or not.
Another premise we had to bear in mind demands an empirical approach: are these judicial instruments working well? Are they being able to maintain, in the future, this constitutional feature?
Well, when we address effective judicial protection and interjurisdictional setting in a constitutional approach, the most visible feature is to understand if, simultaneously, those "constitutional" mechanisms are able to provide and to ensure fundamental rights' protection and if they act as a potential instrument to improve that protection:
-Nowadays, infringement procedure can also incidentally act as fundamental rights' instrument since it will assess Member States' behaviour under the scope of the CFREU; -Concerning preliminary ruling, fundamental rights' protection is one of major addressed issues. On fundamental rights' protection, we should call upon a recent decision of the Portuguese Constitutional Court where one of the most mentioned fundamental rights' dimension is brought into the equation: legal aid. The Portuguese Constitutional Court steps away from its dominant position on the matter, stating legal persons operating for profit can be granted legal aid and, to do so, it uses the CJEU's reasoning in the DEB Deutsche decision. With this decision, national court adopt a way to activate the highest standard of fundamental rights' protection, emanating from EU law, since it comes to the conclusion that the CJEU's interpretation of Article 47 (3 rd paragraph) of the CFREU provides a higher standard of protection than the one this court, in its previous decisions, was able to derive from its Constitution's interpretation.
However, despite going so far, it did not make a reference to the CJEU: in fact, it solves an apparent fundamental rights' conflict between legal aid and free competition and the entrepreneurial freedom by resorting the CJEU reasoning in the DEB Deutsche decision. Still, this Court's decision did not address this issue and the fundamental rights' conflict should have been solved in the EU legal order. As there 97 See, on the matter and for greater development, Nuno Piçarra, As incidências…. Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2017 was no European settled jurisprudence on this issue, the Portuguese Constitutional Court had to refer in order to promote the preliminary ruling final tale: to promote uniform application and interpretation of EU law in all of its space.
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This shows how there is still a resistance to refer to the CJEU. So, introducing a new mechanism would only create further difficulties -in fact, when that Court's Annual Report starts to unravel meaningful developments concerning both mechanisms, introducing a new scheme, which would only compromise further integration.
Under the opportunity opened by the CJEU, in its 2016 Annual Report, concerning "Looking ahead: quality of justice, an ongoing challenge",
98
we have the chance to devise some procedural solutions.
As the Court states: "the quality of justice constitutes an ongoing challenge for every judicial institution" and, therefore, it sets three main axes to reflect in the future: 1) "reforming judicial structure of the European Union"; 2) "recasting the rules of procedure"; and 3) "modernising and reviewing working methods".
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Under this CJEU's sensibility, we are concerned on presenting some procedural solutions to improve both fundamental rights' protection and that can justify a densification of constitutional control mechanisms. However, it is our aim that the structure and genesis of the EU judicial system remain untouched for operative reasons.
The EU cannot take a different path when it was so difficult for Member States' courts to understand the judicial functioning in this widened range of action. In fact, perceiving the CJEU as an appeal court would have this distorting effect we want to avoid. Furthermore, it would compromise that idea of justice's proximity, creating alarming elements in a setting that was hard to accommodate. Recently, Samo Bardutsky stated: "preliminary ruling can overcome some federal flaws..." 100 that can be perceived in the EU.
In this sense, it was our belief, already made public, the infringement procedure should be subjected to a revision, taking into consideration the right to action, one of effective judicial protection's dimensions, besides the ability private parties have to complain to the Commission -which was particularly developed in order to make it more transparent -especially when it comes to failures to fulfil caused by the lack 
actions.
It would also have an impact on how citizens perceive themselves as being part of an integrated system as it is the EU: "it would promote a closer relationship between private parties and the European institutions and it would promote a better way to look after compliance with EU law".
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To better achieve fundamental rights' protection in a proximity matter, we can also vote our attention to a new approach on preliminary ruling references. In fact, when national courts and tribunals face litigation where fundamental rights were the main issue and it was submitted to EU law's scope of application, a particular proceeding to deal with these topics in a more expedient manner should be created. Furthermore, it would have mandatory character since the CJEU should be the privative instance to deal with these relevant topics, despite which national instance was faced with the fundamental rights' problem.
So far, it is quite clear that the path cannot be to create an entirely new instrument but, perhaps, to rely on those that already work as such constitutional control and fundamental rights' protection means; otherwise, functioning problems will emerge. And we already sensed this in another context: "so the European Union jurisdictional structure was not reconfigured, which was always seen as different, it would be important to create a fundamental rights' mechanism which could run before the Court of Justice but that would suffer some kind of filtering to avoid this court would start to seem as an appeal instance and that can be cases ' 'overwhelmed'". 104 Already addressing this sensibility, if a new fundamental rights' protection mechanism would be thought, it would run with influences of existing procedural mechanisms (namely the infringement procedure and the preliminary ruling),
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despite the evolving awareness we have of the conviction that the existing mechanisms are adequate and able to both act as constitutional control and fundamental rights' protection.
This setting will be suited to better improve effective judicial protection in the EU -as our teleological goal -using the method of inter-jurisdictionality and relying on a wide approach to the EU Procedure concept.
Therefore, we believe we now face a real judicial integration which also emanates from the fact of it now being possible to understand that the EU is already equipped with some constitutional control and fundamental rights' protection mechanisms. As stressed recently by the Portuguese judge in the CJEU, Judge Cruz Vilaça, it is quite clear the EU has adopted the idea of a "judicial federalization" to surpass a mere "judicial cooperation"
106/107 -and we think when the Portuguese Judge understands it, he is going further than the expression he is using since there are already signs that show we face a judicial integration, more relatable to the integration process EU is constantly experiencing. It is also this Judge's opinion that the "scheme must be maintained: and what is already existing must be deepened".
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In order to meet this goal, this Judge stated, inter alia, some scenarios that must be greatly emphasised so that judicial integration can fulfil its goals: the CJEU's competences must be enlarged; the cross-border fertilisation between the CJEU and national courts must be densified; a quality interoperable justice must be settled; national supreme courts must intervene, under preliminary references, as amicus curiae...
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Therefore, our sensitivity was corroborated by this European organic Judge because we firmly believe the path must be by deepening judicial integration, which sets aside breaking with the past but, relying and improving jurisdictional instruments already existing in the EU. Only by doing so -it is our belief -, will the EU will be able to overcome those difficulties with which it has been struggling for so long.
